Federal Grants and the Tenth Amendment:   Things as They Are  and Fiscal Federalism by Suben, Mark
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 50 Issue 1 Article 6 
1981 
Federal Grants and the Tenth Amendment: "Things as They Are" 
and Fiscal Federalism 
Mark Suben 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mark Suben, Federal Grants and the Tenth Amendment: "Things as They Are" and Fiscal Federalism, 50 
Fordham L. Rev. 130 (1981). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol50/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
FEDERAL GRANTS AND THE TENTH AMENDMENT:
"THINGS AS THEY ARE"*
AND FISCAL FEDERALISM
INTRODUCTION
The inherent conflict between state sovereignty concerns of the
tenth amendment and federal supremacy as exercised through the
spending power has burgeoned in recent years in the forum of federal
grants.' The tenth amendment enunciates the principle of federalism
by which states function independently unless preempted by federal
authority.2  The spending power, 3 which authorizes Congress to col-
* "They said, 'You have a blue guitar, you do not play things as they are.'
From The Man with the Blue Guitar by Wallace Stevens.
1. A number of scholarly works have recently examined the tenth amend-
ment-spending power conflict in the context of federal grants. R. Cappalli, Rights
and Remedies Under Federal Grants (1979); Fiscal Crisis in American Cities (L.
Hubbell ed. 1979); D. Mandelkev & D. Netsch, State and Local Government in a
Federal System, pt. 1 (1977); State and Local Government Law (S. Sato & A. Van
Alstyne 2d ed. 1977); Brown, Federal Regulation of Collective Bargaining by State
and Local Employees: Constitutional Alternatives, 29 S.C. L. Rev. 343 (1978);
Hanus, Authority Costs in Intergovernmental Relations, in The Nationalization of
State Government (J. Hanus ed. 1981); Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sover-
eignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Kaden
I]; Matsumoto, National League of Cities-From Footnote to Holding-State lmnu-
nity from Commerce Clause Regulation, 1977 Ariz. St. L. J. 35; Schwartz, National
League of Cities v. Usery-The Commerce Power and State Sovereignty Redivivus,
46 Fordham L. Rev. 1115 (1978); Vitullo-Martin & Nathan, Intergovernmental Aid,
in Setting Municipal Priorities 1981 (C. Brecher & R. Horton eds. 1980); Wallick &
Montalto, Symbiosis or Domination: Rights and Remedies Under Grant-Type Assis-
tance Programs, 46 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 159 (1978); Note, Toward New Safeguards
on Conditional Spending: Implications of National League of Cities v. Usery, 26
Amer. U. L. Rev, 726 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Toward New Safeguards]; Note,
National League of Cities v. Usery: A New Approach to State Sovereignty?, 48 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 467 (1977) [hereinafter cited as A New Approach to State Sovereignty];
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Federal Grants: Their Effects
on State-local Expenditures, Employment Levels, Wage Rates (Feb. 1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Federal Grants]; E. Gaffney, An Overview of the Growth of Federal
Regulation by Means of Conditioned Financial Assistance (1981) (unpublished re-
port, Notre Dame Law School); L. Kaden, Federalism in the Courts: Agenda for the
1980's (July 1980) (unpublished report, Columbia University School of Law) [herein-
after cited as Kaden II]; T. Madden, The Law of Federal Grants (Dec. 12, 1979)
(unpublished report, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, United States
Dep't. of Justice, prepared for Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations'
Conference on Grant Law); D. Walker, Federal Judges and Federal Grants: A
Dimension of Today's Dysfunctional Federalism (Dec. 12, 1979) (unpublished re-
port, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations).
2. U.S. Const. amend. X. The parameters and judicial application of the tenth
amendment have shifted from era to era. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819), where the Court described the tenth amendment as follows:
130
FISCAL FEDERALISM
lect taxes and spend for the general welfare, is an important plenary
federal vehicle for implementing national policy, and is the constitu-
"[It] was framed for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies which had been
excited, omits the word 'expressly,' and declares only, that the powers 'not delegated
to the United States, nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states or to the
people;' thus leaving the question, whether the particular power which may become
the subject of contest, has been delegated to the one government, or prohibited to the
other, to depend on a fair construction of the whole instrument." Id. at 406. See also
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (a case of original Supreme Court
jurisdiction with a state plaintiff, joined to a case brought on appeal by a private
plaintiff, challenging the constitutionality of an exercise of the federal spending
power through the Maternity Act of 1921, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224 (repealed (1927)),
where the Court stated that the "exercise of the power of local self-government [is]
reserved to the States by the tenth amendment." Id. at 479. But see United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), where the Court said: "'The [tenth] amendment states
but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. There is nothing in
the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the
relationship bet-veen the national and state governments as it had been established by
the Constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay
fears that the new national government might seek to exercise powers not granted,
and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers." Id. at
124. Note that Darby upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat.
1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)) which,
as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (1974), was curbed by National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (revived tenth amendment analysis under
commerce clause with a categorical analysis centered on traditional areas of sover-
eign state function). See generally The Federalist No. 51, at 320, 323-25 J. Madison)
(Mentor ed. 1961). "In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is
submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are
guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate depart-
ments." Id. at 323; accord Schwartz, supra note 1. The limits of the revived state
sovereignty are still unclear. See United States v. Helsley, 615 F.2d 784, 787-88 (9th
Cir. 1979) (state control over wildlife not exclusive and absolute) (citing Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) and Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436
U.S. 371 (1978)); James v. Ball, 613 F.2d 180, 190 (9th Cir. 1979) (utility services not
traditionally exclusive state prerogative) (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980); Jordan v. Mills,
473 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (traditional governmental functions and their
integrally operative activities are ambiguously defined; prison regulation and opera-
tion are primarily state function).
3. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The spending power is effectuated by the
necessary and proper clause, which authorizes Congress -[t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing [enumerated]
Powers." Id. cl. 18. Chief Justice Marshall set out the limits of the necessary and
proper clause in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819): "Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." Id. at
421. Only one case has ever held a spending program to have abrogated the tenth
amendment. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (struck down a specific
taxing and spending scheme where tax was linked and traceable to the credit, but
declared the spending power a plenary one capable of supporting broad policy
goals).
132 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
tional basis for the system of federal grants. 4 Conditions attached to
federal grants are often the primary way in which policy goals are
4. See Oklahoma v. Schweiker, No. 80-1004, slip. op. at 8 (D.C. Cir. June 18,
1981). Although this Note's argument transcends the characterization of any given
grant, some background discussion of grants is appropriate. There are various types
of grants, including: (1) categorical or functional grants, which the recipient agrees
to spend for a specific or targeted purpose; (2) bloc grants, which are simple cash
transfers that the recipient may spend with full discretion; (3) revenue sharing
grants, which are commonly bloc-type, distributed according to a per capita for-
mula; and (4) matching grants, which may be bloc-type or categorical, but which
are contingent on recipient allocating a proportion of its own budgetary funds. See
H. Groves & R. Bish, Financing Government 356-59 (1973), reprinted in State and
Local Government Law, supra note 1, at 618-20; Brown, supra note 1, at 350-54;
Wallick & Montalto, supra note 1, at 165. These general types and others may be
combined and customized in myriad ways. They are considered to have frequently
disturbing corollary effects. For example, categorical federal grants tend to promote
projects to which local governments do not give high priority. See H. Groves & R.
Bish, Financing Government 356-59 (1973), reprinted in State and Local Govern-
ment Law, supra note 1, at 618-20. When such project grants are disbursed as
matching funds, they have the effect of skewing local budgets away from locally-per-
ceived needs to draw the federal monies. See Oklahoma v. Sehweiker, No. 80-1004,
slip op. at 20 (D.C. Cir. June 18, 1981); Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, Special Revenue Sharing: An Analysis of the Administration's Grant Con-
solidation Proposals 2 (1971), reprinted in State and Local Government Law, supra
note 1, at 617. Likewise, revenue-sharing had the stated purpose of alleviating state
and fiscal problems resulting from increased urbanization, limited taxing powers,
increased geographic concentrations of the poor, and severe inflation. See Watt, The
Goals and Objectives of General Revenue Sharing, 419 Annals 13-17 (1975), re-
printed in State and Local Government Law, supra note 1, at 620-23. The effect of
revenue sharing formulas, which have a ceiling on total aid, is to burden large cities
for which the program was ostensibly designed. See Vitullo-Martin & Nathan, supra
note 1, at 58 (project and formula grants tend to favor rural, high income, small
population states); Federal Grants, supra note 1, at 6 (same). Underlying the prob-
lems of grant application are difficult variations in grant theory. Although the grant
relationship has been characterized as a gift, trust, partnership and contract, the
preferred model seems to be the contractual one. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1539 (1981); see Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568-69
(1974); Wallick & Montalto, supra note 1, at 165 n.33. If a grant is a gift, its
corollary effect is to create a trust relationship. See id. at 168 n.48 (donor who insists
its funds to be used for a restricted purpose establishes a charitable trust). The notion
that grants are gift-like is at the logical core of all cases which treat them as optional.
See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968) ("There is of course no question
that the Federal Government. . . may impose the terms and conditions upon which
its money allotments to the States shall be disbursed .... "); City of Macon v.
Marshall, 439 F. Supp. 1209, 1216-18 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (National League of Cities
leaves open congressional power to control how money from the U.S. Treasury will
be spent). Although grants may use partnership terminology, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §
1601(a)(1976) ("It is the purpose of this Act to create a partnership which permits the
local community, through Federal financial assistance, to exercise the initiative
necessary to satisfy its urban mass transportation requirements."), courts have been
unwilling to impose the general liability of a partner on the federal grantor. Wallick
& Montalto, supra note 1, at 168-69; see United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807,
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realized and necessarily intrude on the autonomy of grant recipi-
ents. 5 Where recipients are states or local governments, a conflict of
constitutional dimensions emerges between the spending power and
the tenth amendment. That conflict is embodied in the surrender of
state and local decisional power in exchange for federal grant funds.'
813-19 (1976) (federal government not liable in tort for grantee's negligence despite
substantial federal involvement almost total federal funding); D.R. Smalley & Sons
v. United States, 372 F.2d 505 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835 (1967) (federal
government could not be sued directly by a firm which contracted with the state of
Ohio to construct part of the interstate highway system, despite 90% federal funding
and other federal involvements). There is a strong line of authority for viewing a
grant as a contract. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531,
1539 (1981); California v. United States, 551 F.2d 843, 848 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 857 (1977); Texas v. United States, 537 F.2d 466, 468-69 (Ct. Cl. 1976);
Arizona v. United States, 494 F.2d 1285, 1287-88 (Ct. CI. 1974); Wallick & Mon-
talto, supra note 1, at 165 n.33. Under contract law, an agreement in which one
party's unconscionably strong bargaining position operates coercively on the other
may not be enforceable against the weaker party. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo,
Contracts § 9-44, at 337 (2d ed. 1977).
5. See generally, Brown, supra note 1, at 348-51 (distinction between procure-
ment contracts and categorical grants); Wallick & Montalto, supra note 1, at 163-64
(federal spending for "procurement," principle purpose of which is acquisition for
the direct benefit of the federal government, distinguished from "'grant-type assist-
ance," main goal of which is transfers to accomplish a public purpose).
6. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1540
n. 13 (1981) (acknowledging conflict, but decided on other grounds); New Hampshire
Dep't of Employment Sec. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240, 245 (Ist Cir. 19S0) (state
unemployment compensation system must conform to federal guidelines as condition
of federal tax credit); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84,
98-99 & n.20 (3d Cir. 1979) ("Pennsylvania has accepted federal funds and has thus
consented to federally mandated standards for the treatment and habilitation of the
developmentally disabled."), rev'd on other grounds, 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981); Walker
Field v. Adams, 606 F.2d 290, 297 (10th Cir. 1979) (conditioning federal grant on
restructuring a county-city public airport funding authority was held not coercive);
Texas Landowners Rights Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025, 1030 (D.D.C. 1978)
(requiring local governments to adopt federally designated flood plain management
rules as a condition of eligibility for federal flood insurance was held not coercive),
aff'd mem., 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979); North
Carolina v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977) (requiring state to amend
its constitution to facilitate compliance with federal conditions attached to federal
health grants was held not coercive), aff'd mern., 435 U.S. 962 (1978); County of Los
Angeles v. Marshall, 442 F. Supp. 1186, 1191 (D.D.C. 1977) (requirement that local
government enact legislation conforming to federal unemployment compensation
guidelines, as a condition of federal tax credit reimbursement, was held not coer-
cive), affd per curiam, 631 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, l01 S. Ct. 113 (1980);
City of Macon v. Marshall, 439 F. Supp. 1209, 1217-18 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (condition-
ing of federal transportation funds was held to induce but not coerce the city to
bargain collectively with bus drivers and maintenance employees when the bus
company was taken over by the city). For a comprehensive listing of circuit and
district court decisions upholding grant conditions imposed under the spending
power, see Oklahoma v. Schweiker, No. 80-1004, slip op. at 9-10 n.9 (D.C. Cir. June
18, 1981).
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The pivotal concept at the point where the tenth amendment and
the spending power intersect is the notion of coercion. Federal grants
that merely induce or lure state compliance with their conditions are
entirely appropriate; those that coerce or mandate compliance would
inhibit state autonomy in contravention of the tenth amendment.
7
The Supreme Court decision in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis8 can
be reduced to a syllogism, dispositive of the coercion issue,0 the effect
of which has been to shield conditions attached to federal grants from
tenth amendment challenge for forty-four years. The syllogism is:
grants are optional; 10 conditions are attached to grants;" therefore
conditions attached to grants are optional.' Because the major
premise that grants are optional has never been judicially refuted, it
has come to have the force of a presumption, and this simple syllogism
has created a seemingly insurmountable barrier to state parties assert-
ing tenth amendment infringement in spending power cases. The state
plaintiff therefore can never meet the threshold burden of establishing
coercion.' 3 Moreover, four years after Steward Machine, the Court
7. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585-90 (1937); United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 73-75 (1936); cf. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1540 n.13 (1981) (acknowledging potential conflict
between spending power and tenth amendment).
8. 301 U.S. 548 (1937). On the subject of coercion, the Court said: "[With
respect to] the exertion of a power akin to undue influence ... the location of the
point at which pressure turns into compulsion, and ceases to be inducement, would
be a question of degree,-at times, perhaps, of fact." Id. at 590.
9. See id. at 586.
10. Id. at 595; see Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923) (grants are
optional so long as they may be refused); North Carolina v. Califano, 445 F. Supp.
532, 535 (E.D.N.C. 1977) (inducements like economic pressure and seduction are not
equivalent to coercion, even where loss of assistance programs can be avoided only by
amendment of state constitution), aff'd mem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978).
11. 301 U.S. at 578; see Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330
U.S. 127, 142-44 (1947) (restriction on political activity of state employees permitted
as a condition to grants); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1136-37 (4th Cir. 1971) (Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration bloc grant conditions permissible even where
not enumerated in enabling legislation); Oklahoma v. Harris, 480 F. Supp. 581,
584-86 (D.D.C. 1979) (conditions reasonably related to legitimate federal pur-
pose for which funds were provided are permissible), aff'd sub noin. Oklahoma v.
Schweiker, No. 80-1004 (D.C. Cir. June 18, 1981); North Carolina v. Califano, 445
F. Supp. 532, 534-35(E.D.N.C. 1977) (stipulated that spending power allows condi-
tions attached to federal grants), aff'd mem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978); see also Kaden I,
supra note 1, at 874-81; Wallick & Montalto, supra note 1, at 164 n.21.
12. 301 U.S. at 592-93, 595; see Walker Field v. Adams, 606 F.2d 290, 297 (10th
Cir. 1979) (conditions which may be avoided by recipient by declining the grant do
not exceed the constitutional limits of the spending power to induce rather than
coerce compliance); see also Oklahoma v. Harris, 480 F. Supp. 581, 587 (D.D.C.
1979), aff'd sub nom. Oklahoma v. Schweiker, No. 80-1004 (D.C. Cir. June 18,
1981); Texas Landowners Rights Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025, 1030 (D.D.C.
1978), aJJ'd mem., 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979); City
of Macon v. Marshall, '439 F. Supp. 1209, 1216-17 (M.D. Ga. 1977); Stiner v.
Califano, 438 F. Supp. 796, 799-800 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
13. See Oklahoma v. Schweiker, No. 80-1004, slip op. at 21-23, 22 n.18 (D.C.
Cir. June 18, 1981).
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directly discredited the tenth amendment as a limit on any federal
power in United States v. Darby.14 Thus, states have had no basis to
challenge the presumption that grants are optional.
Modern fiscal realities, however, suggest that localities may in fact
not have the option to refuse federal grants. Federal grant programs
created under the spending power have intruded on local service
functions as a result of dramatically increased amounts and broad-
ened scope.' 5 In addition, conditions attached to grants have
changed from primary to peripheral or secondary goal effectuating,3
14. 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
15. Federal grant expenditures rose from approximately 160 programs dispersing
$8.3 billion in 1963, to over 447 programs distributing about $82.9 billion by 19S0.
See Madden, supra note 1, at 31 nn.2-3. Different commentators make disparate
estimates of total volume, but there is general agreement on the trend. See Vitullo-
Martin & Nathan, supra note 1, at 46 (federal grants to state and local governments
approximated $90 billion in fiscal 1980); D. Walker, supra note 1, at 5-7 (200
separate federal grants totalled $10 billion in 1964; 500 separate programs in 1979
and a 900% increase, or 322% in constant dollars, in federal aid flows between 1963
and 1979).
16. See Kaden I, supra note 1, at 881-82; Herbers. Chaos in Domestic Aid
Programs is Laid to Congress in U.S. Study, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1980, § A, at 1,
col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Herbers I]; A.B.A. Annual Meeting, 49 U.S.L.W. 2145,
2148 (Aug. 26, 1980). As instruments of public policy, federal grants characteristi-
cally have conditions attached to induce compliance with national policy goals. See
supra note 5 and accompanying text. Grant conditions at one time focused on
ensuring implementation of the goals of the specific programs. See Kaden I, supra
note 1, at 874-81. Now over twenty laws, see Madden, supra note 1, at 2, most
enacted since 1964, impose a broad range of peripheral, incidental, or secondary
national policy goals-through conditions relating to the environment, equal access,
and equal rights, for example-to practically all federal assistance programs. A.B.A.
Annual Meeting, supra, at 2148; see Walker, supra note 1, at 8. For example, wage
rates and nondiscrimination principles do not directly affect the actual construction
of buildings and facilities, yet mandates attached to those kinds of federally funded
projects restrict the grantee's autonomy, lessening its ability to produce more cost-ef-
ficient operations. A.B.A. Annual Meeting, supra, at 2148. Imposing such disparate
policy goals hinders compliance, blurs lines of administrative accountability, and
makes compliance very expensive. See Statement by Mayor Koch, The Mandate
Millstone, (Jan. 24, 1980) (U.S. Conference of Mayors, Washington, D.C.) [herein-
after cited as Koch]. Mayor Koch cites "a maze of complex statutory and administra-
tive directives that, over the past decade, has come to threaten both the initiative and
the financial health of local governments throughout the country [and that has had a]
cumulative impact on [individual cities]." Id. at 1; see Kaden I, supra note 1, at
847; A.B.A. Annual Meeting, supra, at 2148; Toscano, Biting the Federal Hand That
Feeds Us, N.Y. Daily News, Oct. 12, 1980, at 75, col. 1; New York City Office of
Management and Budget, Analysis of Federal and State Mandates 13 (Jan. 21, 1980)
(unpublished memorandum) [hereinafter cited as OMB Memo]; see also Hanus,
supra note 1, at 7 (refers to secondary conditions as "horizontal or crosscutting
requirements, such as affirmative action or public participation mandates" (emphasis
in original)); Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President,
Managing Federal Assistance in the 1980's, A Report to the Congress of the United
States Pursuant to the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977 (Pub.
L. 95-224), at 19-20, 26-27 (March 1980) [hereinafter cited as Federal OMB Report].
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and localities may no longer have the tax revenue sources to fund local
service functions independently.17 Resuscitation of the tenth amend-
ment in National League of Cities v. Usery"8 and recently changed
perspectives on the efficacy of centrally administered government
programs 9 indicates that the stasis which has characterized state
sovereignty issues in federal grant cases for over four decades is ripe
for reexamination. This Note argues that the conflict between the
spending power and the tenth amendment merits closer scrutiny. It
then suggests an approach which admits of modern fiscal realities
without endangering important federal interests.
17. See Kaden I, supra note 1, at 882; see also Herbers, Rochester Fearful oJ
Cutbacks in Reagan's Budget, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 4, § B, at 6,
col. 3 (discussing Rochester's dependence on Federal aid and inability to raise tax
revenues to offset loss of such aid) [hereinafter cited as Herbers II]; Herbers, Should
Washington Share Revenue with States?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1981, § B, at 8, col. 2
(editorial) [hereinafter cited as Herbers III]; Raines, Reagan and States Rights.
Meeting 2 Goals, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 3 (Reagan to restore state
sovereignty, unconditional local control over grant funds); cf. President Reagan's
address to National Urban League (August 1980), quoted in Toscano, supra note 16,
at 75, col. 1 (ultimately, local tax sources to fund programs). Part of the legislative
purpose of revenue-sharing was to alleviate problems caused by diminished local tax
capabilities. See Watt, supra note 4, at 13-17, reprinted in State and Local Govern-
ment Law, supra note 1. at 620-21.
18. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Although National League of Cities was a commerce
clause case which expressly reserved judgment on the application of the tenth amend-
ment to the spending power, id. at 852 n.17 ("We express no view as to whether
different results might obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral operations of state
governments by exercising authority granted it under other sections of the Constitu-
tion such as the spending power. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1 . . ."), it is a widely recognized
starting point for analysis of such a conflict. See Hanus, supra note 1, at 7-8;
Matsumoto, supra note 1, at 37, 83-88; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1129; Wallick &
Montalto, supra note 1, at 171; Toward New Safeguards, supra note 1, at 726-27; A
New Approach to State Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 486. See generally L. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law 313 (1978).
19. The longevity of Steward Machine may reflect the shift toward preference
for a strong central government over the past four decades. Each succeeding genera-
tion has confronted a new rationale for elevating and expanding the power of the
central government at the expense of the states. Current topical discussion of rejuve-
nating "states' rights" and the "new federalism" may presage a decentralizing trend
for the first time since the New Deal. The initial centralizing impetus was the Great
Depression of the 1930's and the coordinated efforts needed to overcome it. See infra
notes 26-28 and accompanying text. In the 1940's the waging of war justified extreme
concentrations of power. See Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101-03 (1946) (war power
justifies imposing federal price controls on states). During the civil rights struggles of
the 1950's and 1960's, state governments came to symbolize political and social
repression, and were often seen as avoiding their constitutional responsibilities. Vic-
tories for personal civil rights were achieved when the national government champi-
oned the cause of individuals against the proponents of "states' rights." State domina-
tion of a broad range of traditionally local activities, such as education and voting,
was replaced by a federal legal presence. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966) (Virginia's poll tax held unconstitutional); Katzenbach v. McClung,
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
In National League of Cities v. Usery,20 the Supreme Court endeav-
ored "to reinvigorate the structure of federalism" 2' in the context of a
congressional attempt to apply federal minimum wage and maximum
hour provisions to state and municipal employees.22  Speaking for a
majority of the Court, Justice Rehnquist stated the principle, for
application under the commerce clause,2 3 that Congress may not "di-
rectly displace the State's freedom to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional [state] governmental functions .... "4 National
League of Cities has become a watershed 25 for revived analyses of
tenth amendment concerns which had lain dormant since 1937. In
that year, the Roosevelt administration succeeded in reversing a line
379 U.S. 294 (1964) (commerce clause used as basis of federal enforcement of civil
rights); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (commerce
clause used as vehicle to enforce civil rights); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (separate but equal state schools held unconstitutional). In the 1970's, the
radical expansion of the federal spending power further hindered the cause of state
sovereignty. See infra pt. III. The framers argued that viable state autonomy in-
creases in importance as the republic grows larger. See The Federalist No. 51, at 323,
325 (J. Madison) (Mentor ed. 1961) -[I]t is important. . . that the larger the society,
provided it lie within a practicable sphere, the more duly capable it will be of
self-government. And happily for the republican cause, the practicable sphere may
be carried to a very great extent by a judicious modification and mixture of the
federal principle." Id. (emphasis omitted). That view is currently vindicated by the
palpable realization that big, centralized government and federal programs that
subordinate the state role, however well-intentioned, have largely failed in their
avowed goals of improving and protecting individual welfare. See Herbers I, supra
note 16, § A, at col. 1 (governmental study found the federal system of domestic aid
programs "unmanageable," "wasteful," "'unaccountable," and "simply out of con-
trol"). As courts customarily draw on contemporary experience as well as legal logic
in making judgments, see Bulova Watch Co. v. Hattori & Co., 50S F. Supp. 1322,
1328 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), it is reasonable to expect modern courts to be more receptive
to tenth amendment arguments.
20. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
21. Hanus, supra note 1, at 7.
22. 426 U.S. at 836. The original act expressly excluded states and localities from
its coverage; the 1974 amendments dissolved that exclusion. Id.
23. See id. at 852 n. 17 ("We express no view as to whether different results might
obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by exercis-
ing authority granted it under other sections of the Constitution such as the spending
power, Art. I § 8, cl. 1, or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."), supra note 18.
24. 426 U.S. at 852.
25. The meaning of this standard and its implications for intergovernmental
relations has been extensively examined in books and articles since the decision was
handed down. See Kaden I, supra note 1; Matsumoto, supra note 1: Schwartz, supra
note 1; Towards New Safeguards, supra note 1; A Newv Approach to State Sorer-
eignty, supra note 1.
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of state autonomy cases 26 and asserting a federal hegemony which
seemed necessary for economic recovery from the Depression.2 7 Al-
though Roosevelt's proposal to reconstitute the Supreme Court was
rejected by Congress, his efforts had substantial impact, thereby influ-
encing the court to expand federal power at the expense of the states'
established tenth amendment rights .28
The spending power authorizes Congress "[t]o lay and collect Taxes
* . . and provide for the ... general Welfare of the United States." 2
While the spending power may be subject to general limitations,30 it is
clearly qualified by the tenth amendment, which limits federal intru-
sion into matters of state sovereignty 3' by providing that "[tihe powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people. ' 32 The tenth amendment, therefore, theoretically limits con-
gressional power to attachment of inducing rather than coercing grant
conditions, but in practice it has represented no impediment. 33
26. See P. Freund, Constitutional Law 260 n.1 (4th ed. 1977), listing major cases
invalidating New Deal legislation, including Ashton v. Cameron County Dist., 298
U.S. 513 (1936) (municipal bankruptcy statute); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.
238 (1936) (coal conservation statute); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,
295 U.S. 555 (1935) (farm mortgage debt reorganization statute); Railroad Retire-
ment Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (railroad retirement statute); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (statute authorizing President to prohibit
the interstate shipment of oil produced in excess of state-fixed quotas).
27. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (companion case to Steward
Machine in framework of shareholders' derivative suit); Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (federal tax and credit scheme involving participants in
state unemployment programs); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937) (federal regulation of industrial labor relations which affect the flow of goods
in interstate commerce).
28. See P. Freund, supra note 26, at 260-62 nn.2-3. The effort has been popu-
larly called the "court-packing" plan of 1937. See Hanus, supra note 1, at 7; see
generally R. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy (1941) (history and anal-
ysis of relationship between the judiciary and other branches of the federal govern-
ment).
29. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see supra note 3.
30. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1936).
31. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 5,48, 585 (1937); United States
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63-68 (1936). But see United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124
(1941).
32. U.S. Const. amend. X. See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819). Because Chief Justice Marshall was constructing early federal
supremacy arguments and was thus very carefully respectful of state sovereignty
concerns, this case can be read as a legislative history of the tenth amendment, id. at
400-37, and the arguments of the parties may be read as summaries of the two
opposing views of federdism. Id. at 322-400.
33. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 591 (1937) (With respect to
spending power "inducement or persuasion [of states] does not go beyond the bounds
of power. We do not fix the outermost line. . . . Definition more precise must abide
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The Supreme Court, in its first major grant case, Massachusetts v.
Mellon,34 disposed of the conflict on jurisdictional grounds and did
not reach the constitutional question.35 At issue was the Maternit3N
Act of 1921, which disbursed federal grant funds to states on condition
they comply with federal standards aimed at reducing maternal and
infant mortality. 36 Although public health was traditionally an area
of state domain, 37 the Court said it would probably "be sufficient to
point out that the powers of the State are not invaded, since the
statute imposes no obligation but simply extends an option which the
State is free to accept or reject. ' 38 Finding no coercion and therefore
no injury in fact, the Court denied the state standing to sue.39
The Court in United States v. Butler40 addressed the constitutional
question in the context of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. 1'
To regulate supply and demand in the area of agricultural produc-
tion, the Act gave cash payments to farmers who agreed to reduce
acreage planted. The funds were raised through a tax on food proces-
sors. Through a special fund, the tax and credit were linked and
traceable one to the other. The tax could be readjusted to meet
payment needs and would terminate when benefits ended-.4  Al-
though the Court held that the spending power is a plenary one,
capable of supporting broad policy goals, 43 it struck down the scheme
as operating coercively as against the states' sovereignty,.4
Butler offered a rationale, through the tax-credit linkage, for limit-
ing federal spending power by the tenth amendment interests of the
states, and was among the last in a line of cases that defended state
the wisdom of the future."); Walker Field v. Adams, 606 F.2d 290, 297-98 (10th Cir.
1979) ("It may be that some conditions imposed under the spending power of
Congress would exceed constitutional limits, but we see no such violation here.");
Brown, supra note 1, at 376 ("Because the law permitting federal conditions in the
disbursement of federal monies is apparently well settled, relatively few recent cases
exist which challenge that premise.").
34. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). The grants were challenged on tenth amendment
grounds. Id. at 479; see supra note 2.
35. 262 U.S. at 485-88. The State of Massachusetts presented no justiciable
controversy, and the private plaintiff had no standing. Id.
36. Ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224 (repealed (1927)).
37. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 205 (1824) (an "acknowledged
power of a state [is] to provide for the health of its citizens").
38. 262 U.S. at 480.
39. Id. at 485. The discussion of the coercion issue as dictum in Mellon presaged
the opinion of Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937), which
reached the same result on the merits.
40. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
41. Ch. 23, 48 Stat. 31 (1933) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-624 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979)).
42. 297 U.S. at 55-56.
43. Id. at 66; see Kaden I, supra note 1, at 872.
44. 297 U.S. at 68-71.
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sovereignty. 45 One year after Butler, a series of landmark decisions
by the Court facilitated a greater concentration of national power.40
The leading case on the spending power as it conflicts with the tenth
amendment is Steward Machine Co. v. Davis.47  In Steward Ma-
chine, the Court upheld the Social Security Act of 1935,48 which
established a tax and credit system to induce states to set up unem-
ployment compensation programs in accordance with federal guide-
lines. 49 Unlike the Agricultural Adjustment Act in Butler, the Social
Security Act allocated the tax revenues to the general fund rather than
to a special fund.5 Because Steward Machine acknowledged that a
spending condition could in principle be coercive and therefore viola-
tive of the tenth amendment, yet refused to find the condition at issue
coercive, it distinguished but did not reject Butler.5 The Court
discussed three separate elements dispositive in upholding the tax-
credit scheme: (1) the arrangement was not coercive in its operation
on the states; 52 (2) the optional condition was related to a legitimately
national goal; 53 and (3) it operated in the context of extreme national
crisis.54  Although the Court discussed relatedness to a legitimate
45. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
46. See P. Freund, supra note 26, at 260-62; cases cited supra note 27.
47. 301 U.S. 548 (1937). It should be noted that the plaintiff in Steward Machine
was a private party. The thrust of this Note is the need of state and local political
subdivisions for greater tenth amendment protection, and thus the argument could
be raised that Steward Machine is distinguishable from any case involving a state or
city plaintiff. Two recent cases with fact patterns virtually identical to Steward
Machine adopt its rationale completely. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec.
v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240, 246 (1st Cir. 1980); County of Los Angeles v. Marshall,
442 F. Supp. 1186, 1190 (D.D.C. 1977), ajf'd per curiam, 631 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 113 (1980). Other recent cases not directly on point still
reaffirm Steward Machine's preeminence on the issue of coercion. See Walker Field
v. Adams, 606 F.2d 290, 297 (10th Cir. 1979); Virginia Surface Mining and Recla-
mation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 432 n.6 (W.D. Va. 1980), aJJ'd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 101
S. Ct. 2352 (1981); Texas Landowners Rights Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025,
1030 (D.D.C. 1978), aJf'd mem., 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
927 (1979); North Carolina v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532, 534-35 (E.D.N.C. 1977),
af-f'd mem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978).
48. Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1976
& Supp. III 1979)).
49. 301 U.S. at 574-76, 588-89.
50. Id. at 592.
51. Id. at 585, 590-93; see Kaden I, supra note 1, at 884.
52. 301 U.S. at 585-91. "The excise is not void as involving the coercion of the
States in contravention of the Tenth Amendment or of restrictions implicit in our
federal form of government." Id. at 585.
53. Id. at 591.
54. Id. at 586. The Court detailed the monumental proportions which unem-
ployment had reached and which states alone were unable to abate. Relevant statis-
tics were marshalled to demonstrate the extreme crisis which justified federal relief
under the general welfare power. Id. at 586-87.
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national purpose and the crisis proportions of national unemploy-
ment, it declared that the "excise is not void as involving the coercion
of the States in contravention of the Tenth Amendment."s5 Coercion
is therefore the threshold question.
A finding of coercion implicates the tenth amendment. At that
point the application of such standards as reasonable relation to a
legitimate national purpose,5 6 overriding national crisis,s' a balancing
of interests approach, 58 or a categorical analysis5 9 may, when appro-
55. Id. at 585. Justice Cardozo's opinion goes on to examine the concepts of
duress versus inducement, in the context of which the crisis porportions of unemploy-
ment are mentioned. Id. at 586. The relationship of the tax to a legitimate national
goal-abatement of national crisis-is stressed. Id. at 591.
56. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978); Ivanhoe Irriga-
tion Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958); Oklahoma v. United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947). Oklahoma addressed the application of a
federal statute proscribing political activities to state government employees. The
court held that, while Congress had no independent power to regulate the political
activities of state officials, it could impose limits as a condition of a federal grant if
the limits were related to a legitimate objective of the federal government. Id.
57. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 548 (1975) (commerce clause case;
upheld application of federal wage and price controls to state employees), distin-
guished in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852-53 (1976) (tempo-
rary federal measures such as the wage-price freeze may burden even traditionally
state prerogatives during temporary periods of national crisis). It was a footnote in
Fry, 421 U.S. at 547 n.7, which recognized a tenth amendment limit on federal
power for the first time since the 1930's, and presaged by one year the holding in
National League of Cities. See Matsumoto, supra note 1, at 36.
58. The balancing approach has been raised by jurists and commentators alike,
and is clearly an important conceptual tool once the threshold burden of showing
coercion has been met. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856
(1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (concurrence assumes a balancing process which is
nowhere mentioned in Rehnquist's majority opinion). Perhaps because of that bur-
den the balancing approach has not been elevated to the status of a legal standard in
this context. See Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070, 1084-85 (5th Cir.
1979); A New Approach to State Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 473-74; see also
Toward New Safeguards, supra note 1, at 747-63 (extensively analyzed federal flood
insurance scheme, in the context of the balancing approach; argued the conditions
effectively not optional, the subject matter undeniably a traditional attribute of state
and local authority, and compliance with the conditions burdensome on local auton-
omy). But see Texas Landowners Rights Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1095, 1030
(D.D.C. 1978) (upheld similar scheme, apparently in the face of a similar argument,
saying that the "suggestion of testing federal coercion upon the States through a
balancing process has long been rejected"), aff'd mere., 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979).
59. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976). This
landmark case, which revivified the tenth amendment in the modern era, established
a "categorical" analysis with which to test the need for federal preemption in com-
merce clause cases. It held "that insofar as [acts passed by Congress operate] to
directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions, they are not within the authority granted Con-
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priate, result in the subordination of state sovereignty. They must,
however, be kept analytically separate from the threshold issue of
coercion.60  Under present legal analysis, municipalities that chal-
lenge grant conditions never win." By holding state and local partic-
ipation in federal spending programs optional under the analytical
framework of Steward Machine,6 2 courts are permitting Congress to
condition federal grants virtually without limitation.
II. CURRENT TEST
A. Concept of Linkage
The conceptual cornerstone of Butler and Steward Machine is the
linkage between taxing and spending programs, or the lack thereof.03
gress by [the commerce clause]." Id. at 852. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying
text. Coercion is self-evident in a commerce clause case because commerce regula-
tions are categorically binding for any activity within their purview; the threshold
question is whether a power reserved to the states has entered the domain of inter-
state commerce and thus comes within that purview. Such categorical analysis is
appropriate in commerce clause cases and in spending power cases to effectuate tenth
amendment concerns. It is not relevant to the question of whether there is coercion.
Coercion analysis is appropriate for spending power cases, where the impact of
conditions and regulations are not conceded to be legally binding per se. See Matsu-
moto, supra note 1, at 84-86. Once that coercion threshold has been reached, courts
may find a categorical analysis useful. Prior to National League of Cities, Justice
Rehnquist and a majority of the Court expressed sensitivity to state sovereignty
concerns in an eleventh amendment grant-in-aid case. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 673-74 (1974) (states do not waive their eleventh amendment immunity to
federal suit when they accept a federal grant). As judicial recognition of a federalism-
based limit on congressional power to condition federal grants, see Matsumoto, supra
note 1, at 86 n.267, Edelman may be even stronger authority than National League
of Cities, standing for the proposition that a state that accepts a grant does not
thereby waive all of its legal rights nor all of its sovereignty. Because Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456-57 (1976), held Edelman to have been decided on grounds
of statutory interpretation, however, it has not become a major case.
60. The elements of "relation to legitimate national purpose" and overriding
"national crisis" are logically components of a balancing process which would tend to
favor dominance of the federal interest. The balancing approach should not, how-
ever, be a modifier of coercion. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. The
application of categorical analysis to the spending power has been expressly reserved.
See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852 n.17 (1976).
61. See cases cited supra note 6.
62. 301 U.S. at 585-91; see Kaden I, supra note 1. at 883-85.
63. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937); supra notes
40-55 and accompanying text. The Court in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1,
54-55 (1936), invalidated a grant because it was formally, legally linked to an
earmarked tax. One year later Steward Machine distinguished Butler on grounds that
there was technically no linkage between the tax and the grant. 301 U.S. at 592. The
term "linkage" is defined for purposes of this Note as the significant relationship
between expenditures and revenues.
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Modern courts, however, do not investigate the implications of such
linkage when they consistently hold with Steward Machine or its
progeny that federal grants are optional. 4 When tax monies go into
the general treasury, grants are not traceable to specific tax reve-
nues, 65 and one may say they are not "linked." In Steward Machine, a
state's refusal to establish a state unemployment system along federal
guidelines would have caused employers in that state to lose the
benefit of a tax credit, but not be relieved of the burden of a federal
tax. 66 The technical separation of the tax and credit by filtering them
through the general fund supported a bifurcated analysis of coer-
cion. 67 The burden of the tax was mandatory; the grants benefits
were technically optional,68 however, because the funds could not be
traced back to the local level.
As a practical matter, the coercion analysis of Steward Machine
may be reasonable where there is a tax-credit device, 9 yet increas-
ingly inadequate for situations where outright federal grants have
been substitutive of state and local budgetary appropriations."0 The
notion that federal grant programs are always optional is of question-
able empirical validity.7' The practical linkage between taxes and
spending, rather than the technical one, must be determinative of
coercion. No technical linkage between taxes and grants may ever be
established so long as taxes go into and grants come out of the general
treasury.72 Nor should such linkage be technically imposed as a
policy matter.7 3 That is, if grants were deemed linked to tax sources
notwithstanding the general fund, they would be coercive per se,
Steward Machine would have to be overruled, and federal power to
condition grants for any reason would be destroyed. That result
would clearly be an intolerable invasion of federal supremacy.7 4 It is
contended that the tenth amendment has remained dormant in rela-
64. See cases cited supra note 6. As indicated, these cases signal a new judicial
awareness of modem fiscal realities. Nevertheless, their holdings perfunctorily ratify
the premise that grants are optional. See pt. II.B infra.
65. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 592-93 (1937).
66. Id. at 574, 592; see Kaden I, supra note 1, at 883-84.
67. 301 U.S. at 585-86.
68. Id. at 574-75.
69. See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text.
70. See Vitullo-Martin & Nathan, supra note 1, at 55; infra notes 92-113 and
accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 92-113 and accompanying text.
72. See 301 U.S. at 592-93; cases cited supra note 6.
73. See Kaden I, supra note 1, at 894.
74. From this perspective, and as a matter of pure logic, no other holding in
Steward Machine could have been reconciled with that federal supremacy which is
the lodestone of our constitutional system. See Kaden 1, supra note 1, at 889. States
often have to subordinate their interests to federal priorities. Id.
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tion to the spending power for these very reasons-that there has
seemed no way to limit the sweep of its implications.
B. Current Applications
Some courts have strictly interpreted the "grants-are-optional"
premise of Steward Machine.75 These courts enunciate a rule that, as
a matter of law, grant conditions are never coercive and eschew
investigation of factual circumstances. Others have begun to formu-
late the coercion issue in quantitative terms by assessing actual impact
on the state fisc. 76
A First Circuit district court 77 defined coercion as the "threat of
economic catastrophe," and concluded that a ten percent penalty on
all federal highway funds did not represent such a threat.7  One
district court in the Fifth Circuit, addressing the question of what
might constitute coercion in quantitative terms, similarly associated
coercion with catastrophe. 79  The Fifth Circuit recently implied80
75. Oklahoma v. Schweiker, No. 80-1004, slip op. at 25-27 (D.C. Cir. June 18,
1981); see City of Macon v. Marshall, 439 F. Supp. 1209, 1217 (M.D. Ga. 1977)
(Steward Machine is not cited, but the proposition for which it stands is adopted
completely-namely, that everything is optional which is not a direct and naked
mandate); Stiner v. Califano, 438 F. Supp. 796, 800 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (citing
Steward Machine).
76. These formulations are described below. See infra notes 77-91 and accompa-
nying text.
77. Vermont v. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. 606 (D. Vt. 1974). The court upheld a
federal statute which reduced state highway grants 10% if the state refused to
comply with a mandate to compensate those who lost their highway billboards as a
result of the statute. The state was to be reimbursed by the federal government 75 %
of the cost of such compensation. Id. at 615-17.
78. Id. at 617. The court acknowledged that choice did not necessarily accom-
pany grant conditions, but upheld the statute involved because it was unable to
determine that the 10 % reduction in highway funds "irresistably compels a state
under threat of economic catastrophe to embrace the federal plan." Id.; see Toward
New Safeguards, supra note 1, at 741-42; A New Approach to State Sovereignty,
supra note 1, at 484.
79. North Carolina v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532, 535 (E.D.N.C. 1977) (upheld
statutory requirement that the state establish a health planning and development
agency as a condition to receiving federal health grants, despite fact that compliance
required state to amend its constitution), aff'd mem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978). The court
said that if need to amend a state constitution in order to satisfy a grant condition
could establish coercion per se, a state could then avoid any unpopular federal grant
condition simply by rigging or construing its state constitution. "[T]he power of the
federal government. . . to impose a condition on federal grants made under a proper
Constitutional power does not exist at the mercy of the State Constitutions or deci-
sions of State Courts." Id. at 535. On the issue of coercion, the court said "the
'coercive' effect of a termination of federal assistance [is not established where] [t]he
actual loss . . . would be less than fifty million dollars [out of 1974 state revenues
which] totalled some 3.1 billion dollars. The impact of such loss could hardly be
described as 'catastrophic' or 'coercive'." Id.
80. Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070, 1084 (5th Cir. 1979) (held
that state could not fire full-time state employee for his absence while attending
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that, had the state or locality suffered "serious financial strains," that
would have constituted a "forced relinquishment of important gov-
ernmental activities" sufficient to trigger National League of Cities.,'
The First Circuit82 recently indicated that it might be amenable to a
well-fashioned argument based on quantitative data, but held that
the data argument before it was ineffectively made. 83
Some courts in the Tenth Circuit have avoided the issue of coercion
by disposing of cases on procedural grounds. For example, County of
Los Angeles v. Marshall 4 was decided on a threshold statutory juris-
dictional issue. 85 The court's failure to reach the substantive issue of
coercion was significant. Compliance with the federal requirement
that the county finance unemployment benefits for its employees,80 in
light of a state constitutional and statutory debt and tax revenue limit,
would have forced the firing of 100,000 government employees and
compelled concomitant service cuts. 7 By sidestepping the constitu-
tional issue and the showing of quantitatively coercive burdens, the
court avoided a meaningful investigation of the actual impact of grant
conditions in the context of modern urban fiscal realities. Further,
because the holding was procedural, the plaintiff had no opportunity
to challenge the constitutionality of the conditions on appeal.
Walker Field v. Adams 8 was also decided on procedural grounds.
The Tenth Circuit did, however, consider the constitutional question.
mandatory National Guard training because state sovereignty under the tenth
amendment and eleventh amendment was abrogated by the war powers).
81. Id. at 1083 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 847
(1976)). It should be noted that National League of Cities devoted considerable
attention to quantitative data analysis before declaring that such preoccupation lay
outside its focus. 426 U.S. at 851.
82. New Hampshire v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
53 (1980). The facts and holding of this case closely paralleled those of Steward
Machine-the state unemployment compensation law must conform to the federal
statute or state disbursements would not be reimbursed in the form of a tax credit.
The court apparently felt that it could not hold otherwise without directly overruling
Steward Machine.
83. Id. at 248.
84. 442 F. Supp. 1186 (D.D.C. 1977), affd, 631 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 113 (1980). As in New Hampshire v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 53 (1980), the facts parallel those of Steward lachine,
so that the district court holding was predetermined.
85. 442 F. Supp. at 1187. The question before the court was whether to issue a
preliminary injunction against application of federal unemployment laws to the state
and local government. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction, but after discussing
the procedural factors affecting jurisdiction, discussed substantively the extent to
which Steward Machine governed the instant fact pattern. id. at 1190-91.
86. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1976).
87. 442 F. Supp. at 1187-88, affd, 631 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 113 (1980); see Herbers II, supra note 17.
88. 606 F.2d 290 (10th Cir. 1979) (district court dismissal upheld). The court
held that a state damages action for delayed reimbursement for the federal share of
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The majority relied on the well-settled proposition that only direct
mandates are coercive; 9 conditions attached to grants are not. In an
eloquent dissent, Judge McKay asserted that the logical distinction
between the commerce power and the spending power is now chimer-
ical: 90
[P]ractical financial needs of present day state governments ...
may well have ended the freedom of choice once inherent in such
conditional grants. Few ... states ... can now supply adequate
services without the benefit of federal largesse, . . .When grants
have risen to this level of necessity, attached conditions must with-
stand close constitutional scrutiny similar to that applied in Na-
tional League of Cities to direct regulation of state governmental
structure. 9'
Because courts have refused to entertain seriously the notion that
conditions attached to grants may be coercive, this Note examines the
nature of modern grants and conditions, and profiles modern munici-
pal finances, in order to construct a more compelling argument which
courts must not ignore.
III. GRANTS AND STATE SOvEREIGNTY-NEED FOR REEXAMINATION
Three factors have recently brought the spending power and the
tenth amendment so sharply into conflict as to render present legal
analysis, which strictly applies the inducement/coercion test of Stew-
ard Machine, inadequate to the needs of the municipal plaintiff and
incompatible with a notion of state fiscal sovereignty.
costs of airport improvements was properly the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims. It held also that a federal requirement that a county and city which had
jointly created a public airport financing authority must, additionally, jointly under-
write that financing authority, did not violate the tenth amendment when no direct
mandatory terms or conditions were imposed and where the localities could avoid
restructuring their relationships or assuming the financial risk simply by declining the
grant. Id. at 297-98.
89. Id. at 297. The court cited City of Macon v. Marshall, 439 F. Supp. 1209,
1216-17 (M.D. Ga. 1977) and Stiner v. Califano, 438 F. Supp. 796, 800 n.4 (W.D.
Okla. 1977), for the proposition that grant conditions are optional, not coercive. 606
F.2d at 297.
90. 606 F.2d at 298-99 (McKay, J., dissenting). The principal logical distinction
between commerce clause and spending power cases, said Judge McKay, "must be
bottomed on the fiction that the spending power cases involve a freedom of choice
which is not available under the mandated programs condemned in National League
of Cities." Id. at 298; qf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 880 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting substitution of grant conditions for mandates
under the commerce clause).
91. 606 F.2d at 298-99 (McKay, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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A. The Nature of Grants
Grant programs have grown radically over the past fifteen years in
quantity and in scope.92 Federal expenditures relating to federal
grant programs increased nearly 900 % between 1963 and 1979.93 In
1963, 160 programs dispensed $8.3 billion; 9 4 by 1980, more than 447
programs dispensed $82.9 billion.95 The size and breadth of pro-
grams has caused increasing state and local dependence on federal
funding. 96  Grants increasingly finance essential, traditionally local
services such as education, social services, health care, income secur-
ity, transportation and environmental protection. 7  As a result of
these trends, federal aid represents an increasingly critical percentage
of municipal budgets.98 It is contended that, were the traditionally
local service functions now increasingly funded by the federal govern-
ment to be thrown back onto local fiscal shoulders, local taxes could
92. See Kaden I, supra note 1, at 871 (intergovernmental transfers: $1.581 billion
in 1948; over $84 billion in 1978); Herbers, Liberals Back Federal Reforms, but on
Their Terms, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1981, § A, at 14, col.1 [hereinafter cited as
Herbers IV] (grant-in-aid programs: $3.2 billion in 1955; $91.5 billion in 1980).
Stated differences in raw results reflect the newness of statistical compilations in this
area and consequential divergent methodologies. Such discrepancies should not ob-
scure the broad agreement among the commentators on the dramatic growth of
federal grants and their impact on local governments. See Kaden II, supra note 1, at
29-37; D. Walker, supra note 1, at 6-8. Walker theorizes that modern fiscal federal-
ism is not collaboration with, but rather federal domination of, states and localities.
Id. at 9. See generally Walker Field v. Adams, 606 F.2d 290 (10th Cir. 1979) (federal
funding of local airport jeopardized by noncompliance); Texas Landowners Rights
Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1978) (federal flood plain insurance
jeopardized), aff'd, 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979);
North Carolina v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977) (federal health grants
jeopardized), aff'd mem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978); City of Macon v. Marshall, 439 F.
Supp. 1209 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (federal transportation grants jeopardized).
93. D. Walker, supra note 1, at 5-7.
94. T. Madden, supra note 1, at 31 nn.2-3.
95. Id. at n.3.
96. See Bahl, Jump, & Schroeder, Federal Policy and the Fiscal Outlook for
Cities, in Fiscal Crisis in American Cities, supra note 1, at 13 (ratio of direct federal
aid as percentage of own-source revenue averages, 1978 estimates: "57.3 percent for
St. Louis, Newark, Buffalo, Cleveland and Boston; 51.8 percent for Baltimore,
Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago and Atlanta'). "Such data leave little doubt about
the critical importance of these programs to the basic financial health of large city
governments. To say that they are being relied on to finance current operations is a
gross understatement. Their curtailment, in money or real terms, would seriously
compromise the financial position of these governments." Id.; see Gustely, Measuring
the Regional Economic Impact on Federal Grant Programs, in Fiscal Crisis in
American Cities, supra note 1, at 61-64 tables 3-1 through 3-4; Walker, Localities
Under the New Intergovernmental System, in Fiscal Crisis in American Cities, supra
note 1, at 32 table 2-2.
97. See Vitullo-Martin & Nathan, supra note 1, at 45, 50.
98. Bureau of Financial Analysis, City of New York, Office of the Comptroller,
Comparative Analysis of New York City's Financial and Economic Indicators, Quar-
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not support them and could not realistically be raised. 0 New York
City is a dramatic case in point. Federal aid was $200 million, or
6.2% of city revenues, in 1965, and was $2.9 billion, or 23.1%, in
1977.100 For fiscal years 1981-1984 it is estimated that federal aid will
be $3.5 billion per year, or 24.3% of total city revenues.' 10
terly Update 14-16 & table VI (Mar. 1981) (ranking the major U.S. cities by percent-
age of general revenues derived from federal and state sources in 1979) [hereinafter
cited as Comptroller's Report]. See generally Advisory Commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations, Regional Growth: Historic Perspective 82 (June 1980) (regional
analysis); Federal Grants, supra note 1, at 8-9 (impact on states of federal grants); D.
Walker, supra note 1, at 8 (direct aid for cities of over 500,000 population has grown
from 28% of their budgets in 1976 to over 50% in 1978). The percentage of federal
aid may be underreported if the funds to metropolitan areas are classified according
to who writes the check to the local government unit. This would fail to account for
the large amounts of state aid derived directly from federal sources and passed
through to localities.
99. See Herbers II, supra note 17 (federal aid to Rochester, N.Y. nearly quadru-
pled to $26.3 million between 1973-1978 and 1978 federal operating grants
amounted to 36.8% of city's tax revenues; when the city tried to raise its property
taxes to compensate for a declining tax base, inflation and federal aid cutbacks,
courts ruled that the increase would violate a state constitutional tax ceiling); see also
supra note 96 and accompanying text. It should be noted that cities, especially in
large urban areas in the Northeast and Midwest, tend to spend more to provide
services to their residents, see Say Big Cities Spend More Per Resident, N.Y. Daily
News, Feb. 15, 1981, at 62, col. 1 (the nation's six largest cities spend more than
twice the national average to provide services to each resident), and to receive less in
federal outlays than their citizens pay in federal taxes. See Federal Spending: The
North's Loss is the Sunbelt's Gain, 1976 Nat'l J. 878, 878-84 (federal anti-northeast
bias claimed); Moynihan, What Will They Do For Neu) York?, N.Y. Times, Jan.'27,
1980 (Magazine), at 30. 32-35 (New York pays 12% of all federal taxes and receives
8% of federal aid); Federal Grants, supra note 1, at 6 (project formula grants tend to
favor rural, high income, small population states); D. Walker, supra note 1, at 8
(growing dependence of cities on federal funds). Grants are increasingly allocated by
needs formulas-the percentage of grants disbursed by formulas rose from 66% In
the mid-1960's to 75% in the later 1970's-but because of formula ceilings on total
aid they discriminate against high-need, eroding tax-base areas in the urban North-
east and Midwest. See Vitullo-Martin & Nathan, supra note 1, at 45-64. As a general
matter, raising local taxes to offset federal aid losses may be a counter-productive
policy. Assuming such increases are not prohibited by state or local tax ceilings, they
tend to raise costs of living and doing business, which prompts local businesses to
relocate, and which may culminate in a net reduction in local tax revenues. See
Moynihan, supra at 30.
100. Vitullo-Martin & Nathan, supra note 1, at 51.
101. Id. at 56. It has been contended that of the $14 billion in estimated federal
aid for New York City in fiscal years 1981-1984, the cost of compliance with 47
different federal and state mandates uses up $8.9 billion; only a net $5.1 billion will
be spent to further the specific goals for which the grants were sought. Toscano,
supra note 16, at 75. For comparable data on other cities, see sources cited supra note
96.
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B. The Nature of Conditions
The nature of conditions attached to grants has changed from
ensuring the primary focus of the grant to effectuating general policies
peripheral or secondary to the purpose for which grant monies were
allocated.10 2  Two examples from the experience of New York City
illustrate the dimensions of the problem. In these cases, funds targeted
for transit or education programs may be diverted by mandated appli-
cations which are ancillary to the programs' primary goals.
First, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973103 requires that
the handicapped have access to transit systems. The estimated cost of
compliance is $1.4 billion, and the failure to comply jeopardizes $435
million in federal transit subsidies. 0 4 Serving a handicapped popula-
tion of approximately 135,000 will divert funds from maintaining a
crumbling transit system that serves 5.3 million riders per weekday, 0 s
and that requires renovation'06 at an estimated cost of $1.4 billion
over the next ten years. 107
Second, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 0s
mandates special education that will cost New York City $565 million
102. See North Carolina v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977) (federal
health funds conditioned not on whether functional standards are met, but on
whether a particular agency is separately created), affd men., 435 U.S. 962 (1978);
City of Macon v. Marshall, 439 F. Supp. 1209 (M.D. Ca. 1977) (federal mass transit
funds conditioned on whether the city permits collective bargaining for transit em-
ployees); supra note 16.
103. Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976)).
104. Toscano, supra note 16, at 75, col. 1; see New York City Sees Costs Savings in
Transit Bill Involving Disabled, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1980, § B, at 10, col. 1
(estimated cost $1.5 to $3.0 billion to put elevators in subways and wheelchair lifts on
buses; noncompliance puts $267 million in federal transit subsidy at risk).
105. See Koch, supra note 16, at 5-8.
106. See Holsendolph, Transit Officials to Resist U.S. Cuts, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11,
1981, § A, at 35, col. 1 (postponing capital projects not feasible); Buses, Subways
Close to Collapse, N.Y. Post, Feb. 27, 1981, at 3, col. 1 (thousands of riders abandon-
ing subways because of state of collapse, not because of high fares).
107. See Still No Light At The End Of The Tunnel, N.Y. Post, Mar. 3, 1981, at 3,
col. 3 (editorial). Section 504 does not permit alternate and less expensive means of
insuring that the handicapped have mobility, such as special vans. In a suit brought
by the Association of Mass Transit Authorities, the District of Columbia District
Court upheld the validity of regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act. American
Pub. Transit Ass'n v. Goldschmidt, 485 F. Supp. 811, 836 (D.D.C. 1980); see Koch,
supra note 16, at 5-8.
108. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976). See Kaden I, supra note 1, at 880-81. This is
an example of the use of federal grants to mold state administrative structures. The
Act seems clearly optional, but offers such great inducements that states are strongly
drawn to comply with the federal guidelines. The penalty for not meeting the needs
of the handicapped is grounded in the fourteenth amendment rights of handicapped
children to equal educational opportunities. See Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F.
Supp. 866, 874-75 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Using this sort of decisional author-
ity, handicapped persons could petition the Secretary of Education to tie-up the
general funds of jurisdictions which do not provide special educational facilities.
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in fiscal year 1981, of which the federal government subsidizes only
six percent ($34 million).109 It has been argued that states and local
school districts cannot afford to make such expenditures and still
provide adequate education for the balance of the school popula-
tion. 110
C. The Dependence of Local Governments
Local governments have developed a dependency on federal grants
as a result of grants' expansion in scope and amount into traditionally
local activities"' and the concomitant gradual decline of independent
local tax revenue resources." 2 The growing significance of grant
programs to localities is reflected in the radical expansion of litigation
in that area since 1975.1 3 Justice Brennan, in his dissent in National
League of Cities, " 4 implicitly acknowledged that grants are no longer
optional for local governments. He noted that those powers which
Congress could no longer exercise under the commerce clause might
be reacquired by simply conditioning federal grants; in other words,
109. Lieberman, Special Ed. Could Be Ed's Special Nemesis: Panel, N.Y. Daily
News, Oct. 19, 1980, at 5, col. 3; see Let's Strengthen Our Voice in Washington, J. of
N.Y. St. Sch. Boards A., June-Apr. 1979, at 7. The estimated average cost to New
York City to educate a handicapped child is $5500 per year; in 1979 the federal
government gave $125 per pupil to the local district toward that effort. Id.
110. See Let's Strengthen Our Voice in Washington, supra note 109, at 7; Koch,
supra note 16, at 8-10. Moreover, "the absolute terms of the mandate discourage any
efforts at the local level to develop alternative approaches to the statutory objec-
tive." Koch, supra note 16, at 10.
111. Grants increasingly finance essential and traditionally local services such as
education, social services, health care, income security, transportation and environ-
mental protection. See Vitullo-Martin & Nathan, supra note 1, at 45, 50; D. Walker,
supra note 1, at 7. Various activities, historically local, are now federally funded to
some degree: "rural fire protection, libraries, jelly fish control, police, historical
preservation, urban gardening, training for use of metric system, arson, home insula-
tion, meals-on-wheels, snow removal, aquaculture, displaced home-makers, educa-
tion of gifted children, development of bikeways, aid to museums, pothole repair,
runaway youth, school security, and art education." Id.; see Peel v. Florida Dep't of
Transp., 600 F.2d 1070, 1083 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Overseeing the transportation system
of the state has traditionally been one of the functions of state government, and thus
appears to be within the activities protected by the tenth amendment.") (citing
United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1978) (licensing drivers is an
integral state function)). But cf. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 38-39
(2d Cir.) (held regulation of traffic to control air pollution is a joint federal-state-lo-
cal responsibility, thus not an integral state governmental function), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 902 (1977).
112. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. Moreover, the funding of
compliance costs by the federal grantor has markedly diminished as a result of
general fiscal scarcity and the greater costs of complying with secondary conditions.
Vitullo-Martin & Nathan, supra note 1, at 51-55.
113. See T. Madden, supra note 1, at 2 (nearly 500 federal cases deal with grants,
80% issued since 1975); supra note 6.
114. 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the result in National League of Cities could be avoided by an arbi-
trary and cynical use of the spending power."15 When grant condi-
tions under the spending power become interchangeable with con-
gressional mandates under the commerce power in their capacity to
implement policy goals, they are coercive, not merely inducive. For
these reasons the municipal grantee which seldom challenged the
grant conditions of the 1960's"16 may have no recourse but to chal-
lenge those of the 1970's and 1980's. 17 Federal courts must begin to
mediate this growing intergovernmental conflict."" The burden of
115. Id. at 880. It should be noted that the majority opinion expressly avoids
application of its analysis to the spending power. Id. at 852 n. 17.
116. There was little motivation to challenge conditions which had scant impact
beyond the terms of the grant, whose mandates tended to be fully funded by the
federal grantor, and which involved comparatively small sums of money in any
event. Cf. T. Madden, supra note 1, at 2 (nearly 500 federal cases deal with grants,
80% issued since 1975).
117. See T. Madden, supra note 1, at 2. Localities are placed in an untenable
position. They cannot afford to accept grants for which compliance cost exceeds or
approaches the value of the grant. See Koch, supra note 16, at 3. Neither can
localities refuse federal aid which has become a substitutive revenue source, see
Vitullo-Martin & Nathan, supra note 1, at 55-58; Herbers II, supra note 17, for
integral local public services like transportation, education and sewage treatment,
see Kaden I, supra note 1, at 847, and which have disrupted local budgetary
processes to the point where large amounts of local monies are now committed to
ongoing federal programs. See Vitullo-Martin & Nathan, supra note 1, at 54 (federal
aid frequently requires large local matching funds; the critical issue is not how much
aid has been received but how much local funds must be committed to get the aid);
Toscano, supra note 16, at 75 (grant conditions too burdensome); Koch, supra note
16, at 1 (47 federal and state mandates will cost $711 million in capital expenditures,
$6.25 billion in operating expenditures, and $1.66 billion in lost revenue over a
four-year period). "[P]articularly after a state has poured significant funding into a
program or facility ... and attendant local expectations have grown, the state can
hardly decline the federal aid necessary to maintain and improve that facility."
Walker Field v. Adams, 606 F.2d 290, 299 (10th Cir. 1979) (McKay, J., dissenting).
118. While some commentators have suggested that the concerns implicated b,
the tenth amendment may be political questions, and thus in their essence beyond the
purview of judicial power, they conclude that the political mechanisms conceived to
resolve political matters have largely failed to do so in the area of the spending
power, and that mounting pressures on our system must be relieved, if at all, by the
courts. See Kaden I, supra note 1, at 885-89. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 208-18 (1962) (civil action charging a Tennessee apportionment statute diluted
voting rights in violation of the fourteenth amendment, listing elements of political
questions which might render such questions nonjusticiable as a function of the
principle of separation of powers); Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
333 U.S. 103, 114 (1948) (whether the statutory standards governing the grant or
denial of applications to engage in overseas air transportation were followed in a
decision of the Civil Aeronautics Board, reviewed by the President, held political
question); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939) (whether a proposed constitu-
tional amendment is still open to state ratification held political); Pacific States Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 151 (1912) (question of whether initiative and
referendum are consistent with a "republican" form of government held to be politi-
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proving coercion will logically continue to fall to the plaintiff locality
as long as grants are legally deemed optional. Challenges to grant
conditions to date have been litigated individually.1 9 Consequently,
it is nearly impossible to argue that the plaintiff locality's potential
loss of a single grant program establishes coercion, whether it be
"threat of economic catastrophe" 120 or any other standard of proof. 12 1
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The situation demands a notion which allows investigation of the
merits of each case. It is necessary to construct a modern linkage
concept utilizing an experiential test that recognizes the impact on
municipalities of federal spending programs, rather than the formal
linkage test derived from Butler and Steward Machine. The Steward
Machine test holds that where a pending program cannot be directly
linked to its revenue sources-as is the case with any grant emanating
from the general fund-inducement can never become coercion. 12
That test should be deemed inapposite by showing that the circum-
stances under which Steward Machine was decided bear no resem-
blance to modern realities of federal and state finances. Research
discloses, however, that modern courts feel constrained to eschew
such demonstrations of actual reliance and cleave to the traditional
approach. 1
2 3
In light of such judicial reluctance, a way must be discovered to
avoid, without discarding, Steward Machine. One such way may be
through an expansive application of the doctrine of judicial notice to
acknowledge the actual reliance of states and municipalities on fed-
eral grants. In an analogous context regarding business relationships,
Chief Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York124 recently
noted:
cal and nonjusticiable by courts); Sawer, Political Questions, 15 U. Toronto L.J. 49
(1963); Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis,
75 Yale L.J. 517 (1966); Weston, Political Questions, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 296 (1925).
The essentially political nature of tenth amendment issues may account partially for
its disuse and avoidance by courts. It was among the first concerns of the framers,
however, as indicated by its place among the first ten amendments, and thus raises
the presumption that some political matters were contemplated as within the compe-
tency of the judiciary. See Kaden I, supra note 1, at 889-97; Matsumoto, supra note
1, at 37-39; E. Gaffney, supra note 1, at 14-16; Kaden I, supra note 1, at 1-3.
119. See cases cited supra note 6; cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976) (plaintiff was an association of cities and states).
120. Vermont v. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. 606, 617 (D. Vt. 1974).
121. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 47-62 and accompanying text; see also R. Cappelli, supra
note 1, at 31.
123. See supra notes 75-91 and accompanying text. Presumably, this is because of
the possible threat to federal supremacy inherent in tampering with Steward Ma-
chine. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
124. Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
(granting personal jurisdiction over Japanese multinational company through the
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We tend to come closer to the mark when we examine a business
relationship from the practical viewpoint of businessmen rather
than through the distorting lens of a legal conceptual framework
established in an earlier era.... [A court] must make use of so
much of judicial notice as is required to understand general com-
mercial settings and the particular relationships of the parties....
The information that may be noticed.., is much broader than
the narrow form of "adjudicative" fact either "'generally known
within the territorial jurisdiction" or capable of "determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be ques-
tioned". .. .
... [W]e cannot apply the law in a way that has any hope of
making sense unless we attempt to visualize the actual world with
which it interacts-and this effort requires judicial notice to edu-
cate the court. us
Such real world analysis in the grants area would recognize that, even
though taxes and grants are not technically linked, the), may be
significantly related. 12 6
Initially, judicial acceptance of a practical linkage notion-the
significant relationship between grant funds and the tax revenue
sources which feed them 127 -would merely admit the realistic premise
that grants are not necessarily optional. Courts could then entertain
the merits of local challenges to federal grant conditions on a case by
activities of its American subsidiary despite precedent under which formal corporate
separateness shielded the parent corporation). Despite the obvious differences be-
tween Bulova Watch and the cases which are the focus of this Note, the creative
procedural notion enunciated by Judge Weinstein has application far beyond the
limits of that case's subject matter. Id. at 1327.
125. Id. at 1327-28 (citations omitted).
126. Judge Weinstein's dynamic analysis has application to the issue of federal
grants: "Multinational activities such as those before us present a factual pattern that
sometimes does not quite fit into either of the two tidy conceptual categories reflected
in [New York law] .... We do not ... ignore traditional indicia utilized to measure
parent-subsidiary control for jurisdictional purposes. Rather, we note that in this as
in so many other areas of the law, stuffing new and complex factual patterns into
absolutely rigid legal cubbyholes often results in distortion of the facts. Some give in
the categories is desirable lest the law lose touch with the real world .... The law
ignores the common sense of a situation at the peril of becoming irrelevant as an
institution.... [P]laintiffs . . . may be denied a natural forum unless the court
carefully analyzes the [significant] economic and social realities . " Id. at 1327.
The gravamen of this Note is the failure of modern courts to expand "tiny concep-
tual" definitions of coercion to admit the "new and complex factual patterns" of
actual state and local reliance on federal revenues. It is contended that the law must
apprehend such realities or risk "becoming irrelevant as an institution." Id.
127. See generally Raines, supra note 17, § A, at 24, col. 6 (suggests the signifi-
cance of the relationship of grants to revenues). The term "linkage", as indicated
above, is offered by this Note to encapsulate varying analyses of that relationship. See
supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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case basis.12 8  Judges might examine the linkage effect inherent in
specific local service programs; that is, to what extent is a municipal-
ity dependent on federal grants in a functional area like transporta-
tion or education, so that, were the aid withdrawn, the locality would
no longer have sufficient tax revenue sources to assume full fiscal
responsibility for the programs without seriously overburdening its tax
base or dangerously reducing its service delivery. 2  Such "forced
relinquishment"'' 30 of local autonomy would duplicate the one found
to violate the tenth amendment in National League of Cities, and
bring the force of the Court's categorical analysis to bear on the
spending power.131
CONCLUSION
Judicial acceptance of a flexible notion of linkage between grant
programs and tax sources would at once preserve federal authority to
condition funding as an instrument of public policy, and restore to the
states an equitable way to defend themselves against federal over-
reaching. It would reactivate a concept of a genuinely federal repub-
lic.
Mark Suben
128. See Kaden I, supra note 1, at 889 ("standards that federal courts can use" to
make federalism-based determinations, once courts acknowledge the constitutional
conflict). Counsel for the state or local plaintiff would bear the burden of fashioning
a quantitatively-based argument. In building a foundation he could draw on govern-
mental and scholarly data analyses which are increasingly available. See supra pt.
III.
129. See Herbers II, supra note 17; supra note 99.
130. 426 U.S. 833, 8,47 (1976).
131. Id. at 852; see supra note 59.
